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Abstract
Face recognition is widely employed in Automated Bor-
der Control (ABC) gates, which verify the face image on
passport or electronic Machine Readable Travel Document
(eMTRD) against the captured image to confirm the iden-
tity of the passport holder. In this paper, we present a ro-
bust morph detection algorithm that is based on differen-
tial morph detection. The proposed method decomposes
the bona fide image captured from the ABC gate and the
digital face image extracted from the eMRTD into the dif-
fuse reconstructed image and a quantized normal map. The
extracted features are further used to learn a linear clas-
sifier (SVM) to detect a morphing attack based on the as-
sessment of differences between the bona fide image from
the ABC gate and the digital face image extracted from
the passport. Owing to the availability of multiple cam-
eras within an ABC gate, we extend the proposed method to
fuse the classification scores to generate the final decision
on morph-attack-detection. To validate our proposed algo-
rithm, we create a morph attack database with overall 588
images, where bona fide are captured in an indoor lighting
environment with a Canon DSLR Camera with one sample
per subject and correspondingly images from ABC gates.
We benchmark our proposed method with the existing state-
of-the-art and can state that the new approach significantly
outperforms previous approaches in the ABC gate scenario.
1. Introduction
Face recognition systems (FRS) are widely deployed
at border crossings, which use Automated Border Control
(ABC) gates. The deployment has ever increased since
member states of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) follow ICAO’s specification 9303 and store
a standardized digital face image in the electronic Machine
Readable Travel Document (eMRTD). However, FRS has
shown to be vulnerable with respect to morphed face im-
Subject1 Morphing Subject2
Figure 1: Digital morphing example from our database
ages - a new image as a result of a weighted linear com-
bination of two input images, as shown in Figure 1. The
generated morphed image challenges the FRS as it can be
used to verify two unique identities (individuals), defeat-
ing the FRS’s ability to verify unique subjects [12]. The
challenge becomes severe as some countries issue the pass-
port based on the digital photo uploaded by the applicant,
which can provide an opportunity to upload a morphed im-
age that can later be verified by an FRS [12, 15]. Several
countermeasures have been proposed for Morphing Attack
Detection (MAD). MAD can be broadly classified into No-
Reference MAD (NR-MAD), which uses a single image for
MAD and Differential MAD (D-MAD), which uses an im-
age pair that includes a trusted live capture, and an image
extracted from eMRTD. In addition, both MAD methods
(NR-MAD and D-MAD) do or do not anticipate potential
artifacts that have been introduced in the image signal with
an optional print and scan process of the facial image [14].
In the rest of the paper, we present related work in Section 2,
our proposed algorithm in Section 3, followed by experi-
mental setup, and results in Section 4, and conclusions and
future-work in Section 5.
2. Related Work
In this section, we review the related-work for D-
MAD for which there are several algorithms, such as
using landmark shifts proposed by Damer et. al [3],
texture-descriptors based approach proposed by Scherhag
et. al [15], and image subtraction based approach pro-
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posed by Ferrara et. al [4]. The authors in [3] conduct
a face alignment using a common facial landmark detec-
tor [7] for each image and compute a distance-vector sub-
sequently from landmark locations to train an SVM-RBF
for morph detection. The authors in [15] also employ the
face-alignment from [7], followed by computing the vector
differences between texture-descriptors such as LBP [10],
BSIF [6], or SIFT [9]. The vector difference is then used
to train an SVM-RBF for differential morph detection. One
of the existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) schemes presented
by authors in [4] tries to invert the morphing process using
image subtraction. The authors observe that given the warp-
ing functions and alpha value, one could perfectly demorph
a morphed image. However, in a practical scenario, the
warping functions, and alpha value are unknown, so the au-
thors obtain warping functions by face alignment, and pre-
scribe α = 0.45 for best quality demorphing. The following
are the limitations of current SOTA in differential MAD,
landmark shifts could occur due to pose changes, texture-
descriptor features would have reduced efficacy in the pres-
ence of lighting, pose, and print-scan artifacts [12], and im-
age subtraction methods would have reduced efficiency in
the presence of lighting, pose, and print-scan artifacts as
shown in Figure 4 some of which are also shown in [4].
In a real border control scenario, the subject is verified
with the captured face image from the ABC gate, which is
compared against the image stored in the eMRTD. This is
what we modeled in our work. We leverage this to verify
if the image on eMRTD is morphed by looking at the 3D
shape and reflectance for both captured images from ABC
and image within the eMRTD. Specifically, we look at the
normal-map and the diffuse reconstructed image, to devise a
classifier that can distinguish bona fide (non-morphed) im-
ages from morphed images. We assert that the morphed
image presents significantly inconsistent information within
the image as compared to the non-morphed image. It has
further to be noted that many ABC gates operate with multi-
ple cameras, which enable us to reinforce the decision with
fusion approaches to detect a morphing attack in a better
manner, as demonstrated in our work. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first method to explore the strengths
of a multi-camera capture set-up in border control opera-
tions to detect the morphing attacks. To assert our approach,
we create a new database with bona fide images of 39 sub-
jects in an ideal enrolment setting and correspondingly the
probe images of the same 39 subjects, which were captured
while crossing the ABC gate. The images from the 39 sub-
jects are used to create morphed images (90).
The key contributions of this work, therefore, can be
summarized as:
• Presents a new database of morphed images and
trusted live capture probe images captured in a real-
istic border crossing scenario with ABC gates.
• Presents a new approach employing the inherent bor-
der crossing scenario to detect the morphing attacks
using a fusion of scores from a quantized normal-map
approach and diffuse reconstructed image characteris-
tics.
• Presents an extensive evaluation of state-of-art D-
MAD techniques to benchmark the proposed algo-
rithm, and demonstrate the superiority of the proposed
algorithm.
3. Proposed Algorithm
In this section, we describe the proposed algorithm for
robust morph detection at an ABC gate. In our approach,
the probe face image, which is captured at the ABC gate,
is compared with a face image from the eMRTD. The ABC
gate face image and the digital face image from the eMRTD
would likely have intensity changes due to lighting differ-
ences in the capture environments, pose changes due to the
capture subject interaction, image quality differences along
with the additional noises introduced in the print-scan pro-
cess preceding the storing of a given digital face image in
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Figure 2: Pipeline of our approach showing the fusion of scores from Camera1, Camera2, Camera3 and Camera4 where each
camera features are in-turn generated by fusion.
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Figure 3: Illustration of feature extraction and classification
for each camera
the eMRTD. Given that these changes may not optimally
help in determining a morph attack, we formulate the prob-
lem of morphing attack detection first by normalizing the
pose changes in the image, further to which we compute
the features for D-MAD. The pipeline of the proposed ap-
proach is depicted in Figure 2, where pose normalization is
carried out first. Further to this, we extract the features to
learn a robust classifier, as shown in Figure 3 for each cam-
era. Given the availability of multiple cameras, we further
propose a weighted sum-rule score level fusion for scores
from each camera. Each of the components of the proposed
method is further detailed, as provided in the subsequent
sections.
3.1. Pose Normalization
We also do pose normalization using the method from
authors in [7] as the face images from ABC Gate could be
in a non-frontal pose. The method we use for pose normal-
ization is based on the key-points which are automatically
detected in a face, and it makes the line joining the eye-
centers horizontal.
3.2. Feature Extraction and Classification
Given the images are now normalized for pose using the
method described in Section 3.1, we proceed to extract the
features. We, therefore, decompose an input image I into
diffuse reconstructed image I(p) and a normal map n(p),
which represents the shape of the face. We choose SfS-
Net [16], as it can decompose a single input image into
the diffuse reconstructed image, normal-map, albedo-map
ρ, and 2nd order spherical harmonic based lighting coeffi-
cients lnm. The diffuse reconstructed image can be written
as with second order spherical harmonics using [2] as fol-
lows:
I(p) = ρr(n(p)) (1)
where r(n(p)) which is reflectance of the material, is given
by
r(n(p)) =
n=2∑
n=0
n∑
m=−n
lnmrnm(n(p)) (2)
where lnm for n = 0 are used from the ambient coefficients
identified in Section 3.1.
As it can be observed from Figure 5, the diffuse recon-
structed image (pixel color differences are highlighted), and
the normal-map (especially around the eye, and the nose re-
gions) help to distinguish the bona fide and morph images,
while in the non-decomposed domain they look quite simi-
lar.
3.2.1 Feature Extraction
We extract the features as depicted in the Figure 3 within
the proposed algorithm shown in Figure 2. Owing to the
robust nature of Alexnet [8] in obtaining reliable features,
we employ the Alexnet to derive features from the diffusely
reconstructed image. Given that the image is diffuse, we as-
sert that it is closer in feature space than input image I . We
use fc7 layer of Alexnet for extracting features resulting
in a feature vector of 4096 elements on which we compute
reconstruction-loss as L1-Loss. We compute a quantized
normal map of 21-bits from the normal map, which is out-
put by SfSNet [16] as quantization would result in the nor-
mal map being robust to small variations. This is followed
by taking the simple difference as L1-Loss.
3.2.2 Feature Classification
Given the set of features, we train a linear SVM for diffuse
reconstruction-loss, and normal-loss. The scores are fused
by weighted fusion to generate the score for each camera.
This is followed by a weighted sum-rule fusion of scores
from each camera to achieve the final score, which can be
used for the detection of morph, as shown in Figure 2. The
weights in both fusion steps are chosen based on a greedy
search optimization algorithm [13]. The weights chosen
for each camera are 0.7 for the diffuse reconstructed image
classifier and 0.3 for the normal-map classifier. The weights
chosen for the cameras are as follows, Camera1 0.2, Cam-
era2 0.3, Camera3 0.2, and Camera4 0.2.
4. Experimental Setup & Results
In this section, we provide details on our database and
the corresponding experimental protocols, following the re-
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Figure 4: Demorphing using Image Subtraction based technqiue by Ferrara et. al [4] of subjects in different conditions fails
especially in (b), and (c) where Bona fide Image is from our dataset. Rows: Digital Images in (a) Bona fide Image captured
in similar lighting & (b), Print-Scan (Inkjet EPSON TM) Images (c). Results are based on our own implementation.
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Figure 5: Image decomposed into Normal-Map and Recon-
struction (Diffuse Reconstructed Image)
sults obtained. We report the performance of the proposed
D-MAD algorithm using the following metrics defined in
the International Standard ISO/IEC 30107-3 [5] described
as follows:
• Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate
(APCER), which is the mis-classification rate of
morph attack presentations.
• Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate
(BPCER), which is the mis-classification of bona fide
presentation as morphs.
We also report Detection Equal Error Rate (D-EER %)
and detection error trade-off curves, to examine the rate of
change of mis-classification errors.
4.1. Morph ABC Database
To simulate the operational scenario with attacks in the
enrolment and trusted probe images from ABC gates, we
created a new database in this work. We want to point out
that in a realistic operational scenario, the digital image in
the eMRTD may be bona fide or morphed. First, we gener-
ate a set of enrolment images for 39 subjects captured in a
realistic studio setting with multiple images using a Canon
DSLR camera of 21 megapixels. Secondly, we capture the
face images of the same 39 subjects in an ABC gate us-
ing a real-world equipment [11]. We employ a single im-
age per subject from DSLR images as a bona fide passport
image and treat the images, which were captured from the
ABC Gate with four different cameras (one sample each)
as bona fide probe images. Employing another session of
DSLR images captured from the enrolment set up, we cre-
ate a morphed passport image dataset using the images from
39 subjects and the approach and conditions mentioned in
work by Raghavendra et al. in [12] specifically subjects not
wearing glasses, and using the same gender, and ethnicity.
The morphed images and bona fide images are printed and
scanned using EPSON XP-860 Printer, and Scanner.
Bona fide Passport Bona fide all Morphed Passport
ABC Gate Cameras
Train 19 237 52
Test 20 222 38
Bona fide per ABC Gate Camera
Camera1 Camera2 Camera3 Camera4
Train 58 64 58 57
Test 57 63 49 53
Table 1: Dataset Details
Performance Protocol: In D-MAD, as we need two im-
ages for morph detection, we consider the bona fide pass-
port images v/s bona fide gate images as the genuine class
samples, and morph passport image v/s bona fide gate im-
age as the attack class samples. We now go into details
of the number of scores generated during training as fol-
lows: From the enrolment, we have 19 bona fide passport
images, complemented with 52 morphed passport images.
Further from Camera 1 in the ABC Gate we have 58 bona
fide probe images, which results in 19×58 = 1102 genuine
scores, and 52× 58 = 3016 attack scores, Camera2 results
in 19 × 64 = 1216 genuine scores, and 52 × 64 = 3328,
Camera3 results in 19 × 58 = 1102 genuine scores, and
52 × 58 = 3016, and Camera4 results in 19 × 57 = 1083
genuine scores, and 52 × 57 = 2964 attack scores. The
number of scores generated during testing is as follows:
From the enrolment 20 bona fide passport images, comple-
mented by 38 morphed passport images. From Camera1 in
the ABC Gate we have 57 bona fide probe images, which re-
sults in 20×57 = 1140 genuine scores, and 38×57 = 2166
attack scores, Camera2 results in 20 × 63 = 1260 gen-
uine scores, and 38 × 63 = 2394, Camera3 results in
20 × 49 = 980 genuine scores, and 38 × 49 = 1862, and
Camera4 results in 20 × 53 = 1060 genuine scores, and
38 × 53 = 2014 attack scores. During fusion of scores of
the four cameras, we reach 980 genuine scores, and 1862 at-
tack scores as this are the minimum number of genuine and
attack scores available in all four cameras during testing.
4.2. Analysis of Results
Table 2 presents the results of the proposed method and
compares it with two state-of-the-art approaches includ-
ing Landmark Shifts based Signed Distance proposed by
Damer et al. [3] and Texture-Descriptors based LBP-SVM
by Scherag et. al [15]. As it can be noted from the Ta-
ble 2, the proposed method outperforms existing SOTA, we
achieve an EER of 8.6±0.1 compared to best EER of SOTA
of 28.5±0.4. The results can also be seen in Figure 6, which
presents the Detection Error Trade-off Curves, where it can
be noted that fusion of scores leads to further improvement
for the proposed algorithm compared to the SOTA. Despite
outperforming the SOTA, we note that our proposed ap-
proach still has moderate deficiency from single cameras,
as shown in Table 2. We make the following observations
from the results:
Method Cam EER BPCER20 BPCER10
Signed 1 43.7±0.2 90.5±0.3 83.4±0.3
Distance [3] 2 46.7±0.3 93.5±0.4 87.8±0.2
3 45.8±0.2 92.7±0.3 86.3±0.7
4 45.1±0.3 91.4±0.4 82.3±0.3
Fused 42.6±0.2 90.0±0.1 81.5±0.3
LBP & 1 41.7±0.4 81.1±0.6 72.4±1.0
SVM [15] 2 42.7±0.5 82.5±0.6 73.5±0.8
3 38.1±0.5 83.3±0.7 71.5±0.6
4 39.6±0.3 79.6±0.5 71.1±0.4
Fused 28.5±0.4 67.2±0.6 54.2±0.8
Proposed 1 18.1±0.1 36.3±0.7 27.1±0.3
Method 2 19.7±0.4 34.7±0.7 28.3±0.7
3 19.1±0.1 35.9±0.1 27.3±0.1
4 18.8±0.1 36.1±0.1 27.5±0.3
Fused 8.6±0.1 13.9±0.4 7.5±0.1
Table 2: Signed Distance by Damer et al. approach [3] using author’s implementation, LBP and SVM by Scherhag et. al [15],
and the proposed method where BPCER20 is BPCER@APCER=5%, and BPCER10 is BPCER@APCER=10%
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Figure 6: DET Curves for (a) LBP-SVM [15], (b) Signed-Distance [3], and (c) the proposed method. DET Curves are
for Scores from Camera1, Camera2, Camera3, Camera4, and Weighted Sum-Rule Fusion of scores from these individual
cameras.
• One can observe that in similar lighting capture envi-
ronments, as shown in Figure 1 (row (a)), Image Sub-
traction based technique proposed by authors in [4]
performs well, and one can generalize this argument
texture descriptor based method report by authors
in [15]. However, the same cannot be said for the tech-
nique proposed by authors in [3] as landmark shifts
could happen due to change in pose.
• Figure 1 shows the degrading performance of the Im-
age Subtraction based method proposed by authors
in [4] in (rows (b), and (c)) which have lighting
changes and print-scan artifacts. The advantage of us-
ing features from a diffuse reconstructed image which
contains lower-order lighting terms, and normal-map
are shown in Figure 5.
• The proposed method achieves the best D-EER com-
pared to the existing SOTA mainly due to two fac-
tors, the use of a diffuse reconstructed image that re-
moves the higher-order lighting components and leads
to a linear light model without cast shadows as pointed
out by Basri et. al [2, 1]. The second factor is the
use of normal-map, which on integration gives depth-
map [?], and depth-map signifies the 3D shape of the
bona fide sample. The 3D shape, and consequently
normal-map of the bona fide sample, should be pre-
served across different cameras.
5. Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we presented a novel and robust scheme
to perform D-MAD in the presence of lighting, pose, and
print-scan artifacts. We have constructed a new database re-
flecting the real-life border crossing scenario and have val-
idated the results on our collected database. Our collected
database models the real-life print-scan artifacts in the pass-
port image and the use of camera images from the ABC
gate. The proposed method outperforms the existing SOTA
methods for D-MAD mainly due to the combined effect of
pose normalization, use of a diffuse-reconstructed image,
and normal map. In future works, the proposed algorithm
shall be tested on a large scale database.
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